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NO. 27 JULY 2018 Introduction 
Preventing a Spillover of the 
Iran-Israel Conflict in Syria 
E3+Russia Should Lead the Way Out 
Gil Murciano 
Israel’s containment policy vis-à-vis Iran in Syria has entered a new phase of direct 
confrontation aimed at achieving a decisive outcome on the ground. Israeli decision-
makers now see a window of opportunity to remove Iran’s long-term military presence 
in Syria through a combination of military and diplomatic means. Israel’s approach is 
based on the assessment that this goal can be achieved while containing the fighting 
to the Syrian arena. Nevertheless, this new strategic attitude increases the likelihood 
of a spillover beyond the Syrian arena and into a regional conflict. Iran’s military 
actions in Syria have demonstrated that its goals exceed the logic of defensive deter-
rence and are driven by an ambition to increase its offensive potential vis-à-vis Israel. 
Germany should take an active role in a coordinated effort by the E3 countries (Ger-
many, France, and the United Kingdom) and Russia to pressure Iran to scale-down its 
military presence while providing it with a face-saving framework to protect its core 
political interests. 
 
Since summer 2017, Iran has made efforts 
to turn Syria into a platform for military 
activity against Israel, prompting a new 
Israeli policy of “active containment” – 
concentrated military and diplomatic ef-
forts to define red lines to Iran’s military 
buildup. In this process, Israel has increased 
the level of risk it is willing to take in order 
to halt Iran’s efforts. Israel’s active contain-
ment campaign was not intended solely to 
deter Iran, but also to convince Russia – 
the main arbiter in Syria – to factor Israeli 
security concerns into the new order it was 
trying to create in Syria. 
Since February 2018, with the scenario 
of direct confrontation between Israel and 
Iran becoming a reality, Israel’s policy has 
been led by a new strategic concept. Israel’s 
leadership now sees the removal of Iran’s 
military presence in Syria as a feasible 
objective. Israel’s formal demand since the 
start of Iran’s involvement has been the 
removal of Iran and its proxies from Syria. 
Nevertheless, Israeli decision-makers have 
now identified a space for decisive action – 
a window of opportunity – to enter into 
a continuous campaign to eliminate Iran’s 
military capabilities in Syria. This new 
approach and its strategic goals are being 
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directed by Israel’s security establishment, 
and they are strongly supported by the 
political leadership, as explained on May 10 
by Israel’s Minister of Intelligence, Yisrael 
Katz: “Israel is decisive … We are confront-
ing Iran with a dilemma – leave Syria or 
get hurt and involved in a conflict … in the 
end it is about breaking the Iranian will to 
be in Syria.” 
The Israeli change of attitude is shaped 
by two main factors: first, specific inter-
national developments that Israel perceives 
as placing Iran in a state of strategic weak-
ness; and second, in response to Iran’s 
recent attempts (February 10, May 10) to 
directly attack Israel as well as the failure 
of Israel’s previous “active containment” 
policy to deter Iran from building its forces 
in Syria. 
The tipping point in Israel’s strategic ap-
proach was Iran’s recently attempted drone 
attack/infiltration into Israeli airspace in 
February. For Israel, this action was a cata-
lyst for an operational reevaluation for two 
reasons. First, it demonstrated in practical 
terms Iran’s willingness to use Syria as a 
base for offensive operations against Israel. 
In this context, Iran’s decision to use a plat-
form carrying a distinct Iranian “signature” 
– namely an Iranian-manufactured drone 
instead of using proxies to act directly 
against Israel – supported Israel’s belief 
that Iran meant to emphasize its involve-
ment. As a senior Israeli military officer 
stated: “This is the first time we saw Iran do 
something against Israel – not by proxy … 
this opened a new period.” Second, it ex-
posed Russia’s inability – or perhaps its 
unwillingness – to prevent its military ally 
from executing direct infiltration attempts 
into Israeli airspace and challenged the 
Israeli perception of Russia serving as a con-
taining factor for Iran’s actions against Israel. 
The fact that the mission was launched from 
the T4 airbase, where Russian advisers are 
regularly present, was likely to enhance 
these doubts. 
A new mode of operations 
Israel’s new approach is currently guided 
by three operational principles. 
1. Taking a toll from the Iranians directly – 
Israel’s new mindset is demonstrated by a 
change in the mode of military operations. 
Current military efforts are aimed almost 
exclusively at Iran’s and Hezbollah’s infra-
structure and personnel in Syria. As ex-
plained on May 24 by a senior Israeli officer: 
“When we identify consolidation [of Iranian 
forces] or the introduction of weapons, we 
act.” Prior to the February drone incident, 
Israel’s military actions against Iran-affili-
ated targets were designed to deter Iran 
rather than harm its forces. Airstrikes such 
as the one launched against an empty base 
that was due to be populated by pro-Iranian 
militias in December 2017 could be seen 
as a warning shot across the bow. Israeli 
policy was to minimize Iranian casualties 
in order to avoid further escalation. In the 
aftermath of the drone incident, it seems 
that the prospect of casualties among Ira-
nian personnel turned from a scenario to 
be avoided into a stated objective of Israeli 
operations. Consequently, Iran’s Quds Force 
in Syria has suffered dozens of casualties 
since February due to Israeli airstrikes. If 
the policy of active containment was de-
signed to signal Israeli resolve and set red 
lines vis-à-vis Iran, the new Israeli approach 
is focused on enforcing these lines through 
military means. Israel’s new approach also 
appears in its willingness now to claim 
responsibility for some of the airstrikes. The 
new logic of decisive maneuver reduces the 
value of preserving operational and politi-
cal ambiguity. Instead, it supports a public 
discourse that is meant to announce Israel’s 
resolve to both domestic and international 
audiences. In this context, the relatively 
broad support that this new mode of opera-
tions in Syria is receiving from the Israeli 
public and across the domestic political 
map provides further backing to this policy 
of open confrontation with Iran. 
2. Distinguishing between Iran and the Bashar 
al-Assad regime – Israeli airstrikes are focused 
solely on targets affiliated with the IRGC 
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Israel’s military operations in Syria since February 2018  
(according to media sources) 
Feb. 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Apr. 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Apr. 30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following the interception of 
an armed Iranian drone, which 
attempted to infiltrate Israeli air-
space, Israel targeted the com-
mand unit controlling the drone 
at the T4 airbase. After Syrian anti-
aircraft fire intercepted an Israeli 
F-16, the Israeli Air Force retaliated 
against Syrian air defense systems 
and Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC) targets. Casualties in-
cluded IRGC personnel.  
An airstrike against the IRGC’s 
drone unit at the T4 airbase 
resulted in the death of at least 
seven Iranian officers, including 
the commanding Colonel. Reports 
indicate that a Tor air defense 
system (SA-15) that Iran was plan-
ning to deploy was an additional 
target of the attack.  
Combined airstrikes against two 
underground missile depots of 
the Quds Force in the Hama and 
Aleppo districts reportedly destroyed 
hundreds of missiles. Reports in-
dicate that one of the targets was 
an Iranian-manufactured anti-air 
defense system. Both attacks report-
edly resulted in Iranian casualties. 
 May 8 
 
 
 
 
May 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 24 
 
 
 
 
Jul. 8 
Israel launched a preemptive strike 
against missile storage facilities and 
launchers shortly before their deploy-
ment for an attack against Israeli 
military installations in the Golan. 
The peak of Israel’s operations 
against Iran’s military presence 
in Syria: Iran attempted to launch 
a rocket barrage against Israeli 
military posts in the Golan. In re-
sponse, Israel launched a large-scale 
attack against the Quds Force’s 
infrastructure in Syria (“Operation 
House of Cards”). Targets were 
military bases, intelligence-gather-
ing posts, logistics centers, and 
weapon storage facilities. It is 
described as the largest military 
operation in the Israel-Syria con-
flict since the 1973 war. Israeli 
decision-makers describe the attack 
as a major setback for the Quds 
Force’s capabilities in Syria. 
Israel allegedly launched an air-
strike against the al-Dabaa airbase, 
which is close to the Syria-Lebanon 
border. Targets were weapon depots 
belonging to Hezbollah. 
Israel allegedly launched an air-
strike against the T4 airbase.  
 
and have avoided, at this phase, hitting 
or threatening targets related to the Assad 
regime. This differs from Israel’s pre–civil 
war strategy of flying sorties above the presi-
dential palace as a means of putting pres-
sure on Assad to contain Hezbollah. Syrian 
army units are targeted only when they get 
directly involved in the Israel-Iran clash – 
as in the case of Syrian air defense units, 
which have suffered heavy losses in their 
attempts to resist Israeli operations – or 
when Syrian army bases host Iranian troops. 
There are three possible explanations 
for this operational policy. First, the drastic 
change in the balance of power between 
Iran and the Assad regime significantly 
reduces the latter’s ability to influence 
Iran’s activity in Syria. Second, an Israeli 
attack on Syria’s political leadership and its 
symbols of sovereignty is likely to increase 
the friction with its main patron – Russia, 
the core goal of which is to strengthen the 
regime’s capacity to rule. Third, this dis-
tinction might be designed to drive a wedge 
between the direct target, Iran, and the in-
directly injured party, Syria. 
3. Synergic military and diplomatic efforts 
– In coordination with the military efforts, 
Israel’s decisive maneuver against Iran’s 
presence is taking place also on the diplo-
matic level. The main objective of these 
efforts is to substantiate Israeli military 
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operations through diplomatic steps (and 
vice versa). This is apparent in the consist-
ent diplomatic efforts being directed at the 
relevant extra-regional actors – Russia, 
the US, and the main European actors – to 
convince them to take concrete positions 
against Iran’s continuing efforts in Syria. 
The effort to mobilize international support 
against Iran’s military presence in Syria was 
a key motive behind Benjamin Netanyahu’s 
visit to Europe in early June and a central 
topic of his meetings with the leaders of 
Germany, France, and the UK. Israel’s policy 
is to present Iran’s presence in Syria and 
its attempts to achieve military nuclear 
capability as two interlinked matters con-
stituting Iran’s destabilizing effect on the 
region – a focus on “Iran and Iran,” as 
Netanyahu described it. Yet, among these 
two, the Syrian issue seems to have received 
priority, necessitating an immediate inter-
national response. Israel’s diplomatic ef-
forts vis-à-vis Russia corresponds directly 
with Israel’s military activity. 
Global factors contributing to 
Israel’s direct confrontation 
approach 
Israel’s perception of a window of oppor-
tunity to act decisively against Iran seems 
to be based on two main developments in 
the Syria policies of the US and Russia. From 
the perspective of the Israeli leadership, 
these developments challenge Iran’s ability 
to maintain its long-term military presence 
in Syria as well as enhance Israel’s freedom 
of military maneuverability in Syria. 
The first development is a readjustment 
in Russia’s approach to Iran’s and Israel’s 
respective roles in Syria. Since May 2018, 
there has been a perceptible change in Rus-
sia’s attitude toward Iran’s long-term mili-
tary presence in Syria and a greater toler-
ance for Israel’s containment policy. The 
evolving escalation between Israel and Iran 
in Syria further exposes the gap between 
Iran’s strategic interest to maintain Syria as 
a component in its deterrence strategy vis-à-
vis Israel, and Russia’s core interest of en-
hancing the effective sovereignty of the 
Assad regime. Even if Israel’s actions against 
Iran are currently not being directed against 
the Assad regime, they are still causing 
damage to its military capacities and carry 
a potential risk to its political resilience. So 
far, these actions have cost the regime a sub-
stantial portion of its air defense capacities. 
Taking a broader perspective, as the 
fighting dies down and the Assad regime 
regains its independent capacity to rule 
over most of Syria’s territory, Russia’s 
reliance on military support from Iran is 
expected to decline. Moreover, as Syria 
slowly shifts from chaos to partial order, 
Russia-Iran relations are gradually shifting 
from alliance to competition. Russia finds 
itself competing with Iran on the future 
political order in Syria as well as over the 
economic benefits of the massive recon-
struction of the country. Although Iran 
remains a key military ally in Syria, the 
evolving reality is gradually transforming 
it into a liability for Russia. 
The change in the Russia-Iran equilib-
rium is mainly being felt on the level of 
political discourse. Since May 2018, a dis-
tinct change in the Russian leadership’s 
discourse regarding the legitimacy of Iran’s 
and Hezbollah’s long-term military pres-
ence in Syria can be observed, much to 
Iran’s dismay. Russian leaders, who once 
described Iran’s future presence as legiti-
mate, are now asserting the need for the 
forces of Iran and Hezbollah to leave Syria 
following the end of the civil war. For 
Israel, this change in Russia’s willingness 
to discuss not only the presence of Iranian 
forces near the 1974 Israel-Syria armistice 
line, but also Iran’s long-term military pres-
ence in Syria is important. In accordance, in 
their recent meetings with Russian leader-
ship in May, Israeli leaders reintroduced 
their demand that Iran must remove its 
forces from Syria. 
Albeit general political statements, a 
basic difference in opinions still exists be-
tween Israel and Russia regarding the scope 
of Russia’s current steps to limit Iran’s mili-
tary presence. Whereas Russia is focusing 
on reaching an understanding that will 
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keep Iranian forces away from the Israel-
Syria armistice line, Israeli demands clearly 
assert that “Iran must leave Syria. All of 
Syria.” In addition, intentions aside, Rus-
sia’s practical ability to limit Iran’s deploy-
ments remains in question. Russia has yet 
to display a commitment toward preventing 
pro-Iranian militias from participating in 
the Assad regime’s recent July offensive in 
the southwest of Syria. In any case, pre-
venting Iran from engaging in activities in 
other parts of Syria is not currently on Rus-
sia’s agenda. On the practical level, Russia 
is still trying to maintain its balancing role 
between Israel and Iran while preserving 
effective working relations with its Iranian 
military ally on the ground. 
Nevertheless, Russia’s current readjust-
ment seems to be influencing its operational 
attitude toward Israel’s demands about – 
and military activity against – Iran in 
Syria. Since this past May, Russia has been 
making considerable diplomatic efforts to 
reengage in discussions regarding Israel’s 
demand to keep Iran’s and Hezbollah’s 
forces away from the Israel-Syria armistice 
line. Some reports indicated Russia’s wil-
lingness to commit to a buffer zone stretch-
ing 60–70 km from the armistice line. 
Russia’s effort was designed to support the 
regime’s successful offensive in the south-
west of Syria by preventing Israel from 
acting against the maneuvering forces. The 
Russian support of this buffer-zone demand 
is hardly new – it served as the basis of the 
Russia-US brokered ceasefire deal in July 
2017. Nevertheless, this move is meaningful 
for Israel for two reasons. First, it indicates 
a renewed Russian willingness to take active 
steps to enforce a future buffer zone in the 
Golan area. Second, if accepted, the new 
framework will substantially broaden the 
buffer zone defined by the July agreement 
and restrict Iran’s ability to use the Golan 
region as a launching pad to attack Israel. 
In the context of Israel’s military cam-
paign, Russia’s critical response to Israel’s 
February and April airstrikes against the T4 
airbase raised initial concerns in Israel that 
Russia might consider suspending the co-
ordination mechanism with Israel, or even 
take steps to limit Israel’s freedom of opera-
tion in Syrian airspace. In this context, the 
relative silence with which Russia responded 
to Israel’s large-scale operation against 
Iran’s infrastructure in Syria on May 10 
(“Operation House of Cards”) could be seen 
as evidence of Russia’s increasing tolerance 
of Israel’s actions. Some reports even claimed 
that Russia gave Israel a green light to act 
against Iranian targets in Syria, just as long 
as the regime is not targeted. In some as-
pects, Russia could even be seen as a bene-
ficiary of Israel’s actions, since it shares 
Israel’s ambition of curbing Iran’s influence 
but lacks the capability to do so. Russia’s 
recent decision in May to refrain from sup-
plying Syria with upgraded S-300 air de-
fense systems serves as an additional indi-
cation that Russia does not intend to limit 
Israel’s freedom of operation in Syria. Israel 
therefore seems to at least be achieving its 
basic goal vis-à-vis Russia – ensuring that 
Russia will stay out of Israel’s way. 
The second development is Israel’s per-
ception of Iran’s strategic weakness follow-
ing the US decision to impose secondary 
sanctions on Iran – Israel’s direct confron-
tation approach vis-à-vis Iran in Syria corre-
lates with the confrontational Iran strategy 
recently adopted by the administration of 
Donald Trump. This relates to the admin-
istration’s decision to withdraw from the 
nuclear deal with Iran (Joint Comprehen-
sive Plan of Action – JCPOA), and even 
more so to its decision to introduce a new 
set of comprehensive sanctions on Iran. 
Israel’s assessment is that these sanctions 
will have a direct effect on Iran’s strategic 
position as well as on its domestic resili-
ence. In the Syrian context, Israeli leaders 
seem to believe that the sanctions’ negative 
effects on Iran’s economy will increase 
domestic criticism concerning the costly 
intervention in Syria, and therefore impede 
Iran’s ability to preserve its military pres-
ence. In addition, the new emphasis by 
the Trump administration on Iran’s actions 
beyond its borders raises Israeli hopes for 
an increase in US political and intelligence 
support for Israel’s containment campaign. 
Recent reports indicate that Trump will 
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express support for Israel’s demand to 
remove Iran’s military presence from Syria 
during his July 16 meeting with Putin. 
The risk of a regional spillover 
In their actions against Iranian personnel 
and facilities, Israel has demonstrated its 
willingness to accept the risk of further 
escalation in order to roll back Iran’s pres-
ence. Nevertheless, the events of the last 
two months have enhanced the Israeli per-
ception that Iran’s operational capabilities 
could be neutralized without the situation 
deteriorating into a regional war. Israel is 
therefore aiming to conduct a “deluxe war” 
against Iran in Syria – utilizing its fire-
power superiority to dismantle Iran’s 
stronghold piece by piece without paying 
the human, political, and economic price 
of a full-out conflict. Specifically, the lack 
of Iranian reaction to the “House of Cards” 
operation is seen in Israel as affirmation of 
the “arena isolation” logic – the operation-
al concept that Israel could engage in direct 
military conflict with Iran in Syria while 
preventing a spillover into other arenas. 
Israel’s current mindset relates to the 
perceived success of Israel’s deterrence vis-
à-vis Hezbollah in Lebanon. Keeping Hez-
bollah – and its vast stockpiles of more 
than 100,000 rockets targeted at Israel’s 
home front – away from the fighting is 
considered a central goal by Israeli decision-
makers. 
Nevertheless, the continuation of the 
direct Iran-Israel conflict in Syria increases 
the chances for escalation, both within the 
Syrian arena and beyond. Hoping to use its 
perceived window of opportunity, Israel is 
likely to continue – and even increase – 
the rate and magnitude of its attacks against 
Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria, for 
example by targeting high-ranking Iranian 
officers. Iran, out of principle and especial-
ly in its current international position, 
is highly unlikely to cave in to Israeli de-
mands and reduce its military activity 
under Israeli military pressure. With the 
JCPOA in serious jeopardy and an Israeli 
attack on Iranian nuclear installations be-
coming a valid possibility once more, the 
value of the Syrian outpost for Iran’s deter-
rence policy vis-à-vis Israel is greater than 
ever. In addition, with Iran’s international 
position being challenged by the US, a with-
drawal from Syria under fire is hardly a loss 
Iran can afford. Its continued presence in 
Syria is therefore both a key strategic inter-
est and a matter of national prestige. At the 
current stage, both Israel and Iran are dis-
playing a lack of motivation to expand the 
scope of warfare beyond the Syrian context. 
Nevertheless, both parties’ actions demon-
strate their willingness to risk further esca-
lation of the conflict to protect their core 
interests in Syria. 
The key catalyst that could transform the 
Israel-Iran conflict in Syria into a regional 
one is the danger of a spillover into Lebanon. 
If Iran decides to involve Hezbollah and its 
massive stockpiles of rockets against Israel’s 
home front, Israel will likely use unprec-
edented levels of military force, resulting 
in destructive outcomes for Lebanon. Con-
sidering Hezbollah’s current capabilities to 
hit strategic targets in Israel; the growing 
Israeli tendency to categorize Hezbollah, 
the Lebanese Army, and the Lebanese politi-
cal system as one entity; and Israeli leaders’ 
threats to turn Lebanon “into a wasteland” 
in a future war, such a conflict is expected 
to be greater in magnitude than any of the 
preceding rounds of fighting between the 
parties. It could easily precipitate a further 
expansion of the warfare into a regional 
conflict. Echoing Israeli Defense, Minister 
Avigdor Liberman’s warning that “if Iran 
attacks Tel Aviv – Israel will attack Tehran,” 
an attack on Israel’s home front by Iran or 
Hezbollah could instigate an Israeli response 
that will be felt not only in Lebanon and 
Syria but also in Iran. 
On the immediate level, four potential 
developments could instigate a further 
escalation and a spillover of the Israel-Iran 
conflict beyond the Syrian scope: 
1. A continuation of Iran’s current efforts to 
build its independent operational capabilities in 
Syria – for example through the placement 
of new weapons systems, an assimilation of 
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its forces into the Syrian army as independ-
ent units, enhancement of Hezbollah’s stra-
tegic capability to inflict damage on Israel, 
building new air and naval bases in Syria, 
and the deployment of Hezbollah and pro-
Iranian militias near the 1974 armistice 
line. The incremental buildup of Iranian 
forces in Syria is likely to lead to an en-
hanced Israeli response and a dynamic of 
reciprocal escalation. 
2. A belated Iranian retaliation for “Opera-
tion House of Cards” – aimed at seeking re-
venge for Iranian losses and deterring addi-
tional Israeli attacks. Such a retaliation could 
be launched from Syrian territory in the 
form of yet another rocket barrage against 
Israeli military installations in the Golan, 
a high-trajectory attack against strategic 
targets in Israel, or a tactical attack by pro-
Iranian militias on Israeli forces in the line 
of skirmish. It could also duplicate previous 
IRGC tactics and be launched against Israeli 
targets abroad. An Iranian retaliation – 
and especially one that attempts to expand 
the fighting to other arenas or damage the 
Israeli home front – is likely to evoke a 
strong Israeli response, which is unlikely 
to stay limited to Syria alone. 
3. An Israeli ground engagement with Quds 
Force/pro-Iranian militias following Assad’s cam-
paign to regain control over the armistice-line 
area – The inclusion of Hezbollah and pro-
Iranian militias in the current campaign 
challenges Israel’s core policy of opposing 
the presence of pro-Iranian forces near the 
armistice line. A Russian failure to prevent 
the future deployment of pro-Iranian troops 
in the area could lead Israel to attack these 
forces. These concerns gain relevance with 
Iran’s public rejection of any limitations on 
its current activity in the south of Syria. 
4. Aside from scenarios of unintended 
escalation, a spillover of the conflict could 
also result from a premeditated decision by 
Iran’s leadership. Such a decision to escalate 
could be taken if Israeli military efforts put 
Iran’s back to the wall in Syria. While Isra-
el’s policy is aimed at pushing Iran to a 
decision-making juncture where it has to 
choose between leaving Syria and escalating 
the fighting, Israel might find Iran choosing 
the second option and expanding the scope 
of conflict. Furthermore, an escalation 
by Iran could also occur as an outcome of 
broader international developments, which 
the regime in Iran might interpret as a threat 
to its stability: for example, the collapse of 
the JCPOA, an estimation that an imminent 
Israeli attack is about to be launched against 
Iran’s nuclear facilities, or a direct regional 
conflict with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
States. Any such development could create 
new incentives for Iranian decision-makers 
to challenge the status quo by utilizing its 
Syrian trump card, for what it is worth. 
A Euro-Russian approach to 
de-escalation 
Since early 2018, Iran has demonstrated an 
ambition to use its direct intervention in 
Syria as an opportunity to turn the country 
into a strategic platform for offensive action 
against Israel. In response, Israel has adopted 
an “all or nothing” approach to Iran’s pres-
ence in Syria, culminating in a military 
effort to push back Iran. This approach sets 
a policy goal that can hardly be accom-
plished without sparking a regional war. 
The main goal of the international com-
munity should be to stop the escalation by 
pressuring Iran to scale-down its military 
presence in Syria while convincing Israel to 
abstain from using military force in Syria. 
This goal necessitates two types of effort. 
First, it requires a firm international com-
mitment against Iran’s continuing efforts to 
enhance its operational capabilities in Syria. 
Second, it necessitates that the international 
community advance an understanding be-
tween Israel and Iran about the limitations 
of Iran’s future military presence in Syria. 
In this, it should follow a “dual-track” 
approach that combines a diplomatic dia-
logue with concrete measures to pressure 
Iran, as was done by the E3 countries in 
the early phases of the nuclear negotiations 
with Iran. 
Considering the international actors’ 
interests and capacities, the most effective 
framework with which to achieve a scale-
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down is a combined effort led by the E3 
countries in coordination with Russia. 
A spillover of the conflict into Lebanon 
and beyond would have a destabilizing 
impact on Europe. With more than a mil-
lion Syrian refugees in Lebanon alone, such 
a conflict would likely generate a new 
exodus of refugees toward Europe. The con-
flict would also create a new inflammatory 
context, leading to the intensification of 
terror activities and radicalization across 
the continent. In addition, it would most 
likely lead to the collapse of the JCPOA. 
A crucial aspect in achieving a scale-
down depends on providing Iran with a 
face-saving approach to make such a stra-
tegic compromise and to secure Israel’s 
commitment to the compromise at the 
same time. This could be achieved by incor-
porating Iran in the process of defining 
accepted limitations on its presence in Syria 
and by implementing the scale-down in a 
gradual manner to avoid the appearance of 
a defeat. This effort should be designed to 
first deal with the urgent matters of reduc-
ing Iran’s offensive capabilities and pre-
venting the presence of pro-Iranian forces 
in the vicinity of the armistice line. Later, 
it could be expanded to deal with the stra-
tegic issues of Iran’s long-term presence in 
Syria and Iran’s advanced weapons supply 
to Hezbollah. The challenge is to find a 
formula that satisfies Israel’s security needs 
while allowing Iran to preserve a certain 
level of political and economic influence 
in Syria as well as allowing its leaders to 
save face. 
Beyond the immediate objective of 
preventing a regional escalation, a gradual 
scale-down of Iranian forces in Syria could 
create a positive dynamic in supporting the 
efforts to preserve the JCPOA. Iran’s mili-
tary activities beyond its borders serves as 
a distinct justification for both the Trump 
administration and the Israeli government 
to oppose the JCPOA. Addressing the topic 
could thus serve as a starting point for 
diplomatic reengagement by all parties in-
volved with the framework of the JCPOA. 
The E3 countries are already involved in 
a strategic dialogue with Iran on its regional 
policy through the framework of the “struc-
tured dialogue,” which was initiated by 
Germany during the 2018 Munich Security 
Conference. In this context, Iran’s military 
activity in Syria should become a core issue 
alongside the E3’s key effort to preserve the 
JCPOA. 
Germany has the potential to fulfill an 
important role in these efforts. In its special 
position as both a strategic partner of Israel 
and a party to an ongoing dialogue with 
Iran – with which it enjoys relative credibil-
ity and political access – Germany could 
lead the strategic dialogue with the two par-
ties over a possible formula for de-escalation. 
The inclusion of Russia in such a frame-
work is vital, not just in terms of leverage, 
but also to provide an effective means for 
upholding the agreed-upon rules of engage-
ment. Having boots on the ground and 
dominance in the Syrian airspace, Russia 
is the only international actor capable of 
monitoring – and potentially even enforc-
ing – the terms of such an understanding. 
The gradual change in Russia’s attitude 
toward Iran’s long-term presence in Syria 
has led to a convergence of perceptions 
between Russia and the E3 regarding the 
combustible potential of Iran’s current 
activities in Syria. This creates common 
ground for a combined behind-the-scene 
diplomatic effort (E3+Russia) to pressure 
Iran to accept limitations on its military 
activity in Syria. 
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